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CASES NOTED
the doctrine to only a portion of a will, and in effect completely circum-
vented the issue by resolving the case on the basis of the testatrix's
dominant purpose in executing her will. Conceding that the dominant
purpose of the will was to dispose of the testatrix's estate, certainly
the residuary clause was in no way contradictory to that purpose. In
this light, since the residuary beneficiary was expressly provided for in
the prior and subsequent will, it is suggested that the effect of this
decision is contrary to the twice expressed intent of the testatrix, thus
possibly placing the court in the tenuous position of "rewriting a will."
The court could have escaped its evident discomfort by drawing a logical
analogy between charitable bequests and the situation in the instant
case. Since the Florida Supreme Court has recognized the validity of
applying the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to a portion of
a prior will where charitable bequests are concerned,4" the next logical
extension would have been the application of those principles to the
instant case, thereby mitigating the harshness of its decision with sound
legal principles of Florida law.
STANLEY L. LESTER
MOTOR VEHICLE CONDITIONAL SALES-INAPPLICABILITY
OF A STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
OF COMITY
The plaintiff vendor entered into a conditional sales contract for the
sale of an automobile in Massachusetts. Massachusetts does not require
recordation of the contract. The conditional vendee defaulted and re-
moved the automobile to Florida where he obtained a Florida title
certificate noting Massachusetts as the state of previous registration.
The automobile was subsequently purchased with the Florida title
certificate by the defendant from the conditional vendee. The defendant
had no notice of the conditional sales contract. Inquiries made by the
defendant complied with the requirements of the Florida statute pertain-
ing to foreign vehicles sold without a Florida title certificate.' In a
replevin action the court granted defendant's motion for summary
43. In re Blankenship's Estate, 122 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1960).
1. FiA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(f) (1961) provides that any person "purchasing a motor
vehicle upon which no certificate of title has been issued in Florida shall be deemed to be
an innocent purchaser for value" if certain provisions are complied with. The statute requires
the purchaser to obtain a sworn statement from the seller that no lien exists and the name
and address of the owner on the date the current tag on the vehicle was acquired; that
such statement be attached to the certificate of title if one has been issued; and to obtain
a telegram or written statement from the proper recording officer in the state, county or
city of the seller to the effect that no lien is recorded there. The latter provision need
not be complied with when the purchase is made in states which do not require recordation
of such contracts or liens in order for them to be enforceable against subsequent purchasers.
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judgment on the basis of his compliance with this statute. On appeal,
held, reversed: the statute does not apply to purchases of foreign
vehicles upon which a certificate of title has been issued in Florida;
applying the rule of comity, the inquiry was insufficient to satisfy the
requirements under Massachusetts law. Ferry Street Motor Sales, Inc.
v. Municipal Auto Sales, Inc., 137 So12d 842 (Fla. App. 1962).
The common law rule of comity, followed in Florida, gives full
effect to contract rights acquired and perfected under the law of the
state where the contract was made and the property situated;2 these
rights will be enforced unless a statute clearly directs otherwise.3 The
defendant in the Ferry case attempted to establish that the statute
in question was a clear direction against the rule of comity.
Deciding whether or not a statute is a clear direction against the
rule of comity is not a novel problem in Florida. A Florida statute
adopted in 19414 was held to require recordation in Florida of a
conditional sales contract if the rights of the conditional vendor were to
be superior to those of a subsequent purchaser.5 The burden placed upon
a conditional seller prompted comment and criticism of this position.'
The present statute7 attempts to alleviate the burden placed on the
conditional seller. Protection is given to the purchaser of a foreign
vehicle sold in Florida without a Florida title certificate having been
issued.' He is deemed a bona fide purchaser upon satisfying certain
requirements of the statute.
Cases interpreting the Florida statute have not required the courts
to differentiate between purchases of foreign vehicles upon which no
Florida title certificate has been issued and those purchased after a
Florida title certificate has been issued;9 however, the dictum of the
2. Greer v. Commercial & Exch. Bank, 118 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1960).
3. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954); Livingston
v. National Shawmut Bank, 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1952); McQueen v. M. & J. Fin. Corp., 59
So.2d 49 (Fla. 1952); Greer v. Commercial & Exch. Bank, 118 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1960);
Capital Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 105 So.2d 899 (Fla.
App. 1958).
4. FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1961). "No liens for purchase money or as security for a debt
in the form of retain title contract, conditional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, or otherwise,
on a motor vehicle, as now or may hereafter be defined by law, shall be enforceable in
any of the courts of this state, against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable
consideration and without notice, unless a sworn notice of such lien . . . shall be recorded
in the office of -the Motor Vehicle Commissioner of the State. ... "
5. Inman v. Rowsey, 41 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1949); Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 158 Fla.
481, 32 So.2d 7 (1947); 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 117 (1950).
6. 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 117 (1950).
7. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(f) (1961).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954); Livingston
v. National Shawmut Bank, 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1952); McQueen v. M. & J. Fin. Corp.,
59 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1952); Greer v. Commercial & Exch. Bank, 118 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1960).
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supreme court in Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,10
attempted to treat both situations as one. That case was decided on the
basis of the rule of comity, but the court said that even if this rule did
not apply section 319.27(3)(f) would be applicable to defeat the rights
of the Florida purchaser.11 The court reasoned that:
[S]ince the Florida certificate of title issued on a car with a
previous out-of-state registration shows on its face that the
car was previously registered in such other state . . . such
subsequent purchaser is put on notice that a lien may have
attached to the car during its sojourn in that state. He is
charged with knowledge of the provisions of Chapter 319 ... so
he must know that the title of his vendor will be defective
unless the requirements of Section 319.27(3)(f) . . . have
been met .... 12
After the decision in the Vincent case, section 319.27(3)(f)' 8 was
amended by the addition of a second paragraph. Under this amendment
the inquiries previously required may be omitted if the sale is made in
a state which does not require recordation of such contracts or liens in
order for them to be enforceable against subsequent purchasers.' 4
The wording of this amendment seems to be derived from the Vincent
case. If the purpose of this amendment was to bring purchasers such
as the one in the Vincent case within the protection of the Florida
statute,' the Ferry case has made this result impossible. Under the
new amendment the purchaser in the Vincent case would have been
in compliance with the statute1" but it could not be applied to him since
he purchased after a Florida title certificate was obtained. The legisla-
ture's implied accord with the dictum of the supreme court 17 which
applied section 319.27(3)(f) in the Vincent case even though the
purchase was with a Florida title certificate, is ignored in the Ferry case.
The decision that the Florida statute 8 does not apply to purchases
of vehicles with a Florida title certificate is not unreasonable on its face.
It is consistent with the plain language of the statute. Only the lack of
consistency resulting from such a strict application of this statute can
be questioned. That a purchaser should be denied the protection of this
statute merely because he purchased after a Florida title certificate had
been isued is unreasonable. The Florida title certificate did not give
any added protection to the purchaser.19
10. 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954).
11. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954).
12. Id. at 781.
13. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-340, § 1.
14. See note 1 supra.
15. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(f) (1961).
16. Ibid.
17. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954).
18. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(3)(f) (1961).
19. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778, 781 (Fla. 1954).
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The Florida courts may not follow the Ferry case and rather may
hold to the dictum of the supreme court in the Vincent2" case, or the
legislature may amend the statute to accomplish the same result. Either
alternative would correct the present inconsistency in the law; however, a
much more practical solution should be considered. The problem here,
and in many similar situations arising because of the inherent mobility
of automobiles, could be corrected by the adoption of uniform recording
acts2 by all states.22 Meanwhile, a Florida purchaser is not safe in
purchasing a vehicle from a state which has no recording requirements
(such as Massachusetts) if a Florida certificate of title has been obtained
for that vehicle.
CARLOS P. LAMAR III
20. Ibid.
21. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act (1955) has been
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. One stated
purpose of the act is to curtail losses of buyers from purchases of vehicles subject -to defects
in title and undisclosed liens. UNIFORMf MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-
THEFT ACT § 1. In 1957 only one state, Connecticut, had adopted this act. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COM ISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 315 (1957).
22. 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 117 (1950).
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